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1. Preface 
2014 opened in Bangladesh with the elections, held on 5th January 
amidst unprecedented political violence which led to the killing of 29 
people. The 2014 elections were recorded as the most violent in Bangla-
desh’s history.1 
Throughout 2014, the government of the re-elected Prime Minister 
Sheikh Hasina faced several challenges. Firstly, the political crisis, fuelled 
by an alliance of 18 political parties led by the Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party (BNP), threatened to trigger a wave of protests similar to those of 
2013. In turn, political instability brought to the fore the risk of adverse 
fallout on the economic situation. Secondly, the trials for the 1971 war 
crimes started in 2010, reaching their highest momentum in 2013 and 
continuing in 2014, with varied reactions from national and international 
public opinion. Thirdly, Sheikh Hasina’s government was charged with 
corruption and human rights abuses. 
In 2013, for the first time in Bangladesh’s history, the incumbent 
prime minister gained a second mandate.2 The large majority obtained 
by the Awami League allowed Sheikh Hasina to lead the country with 
a steadiness never experienced before, not even by Hasina’s main rival, 
Khaleda Zia. 
A multifaceted and ambitious foreign policy has been a new factor, 
with stronger ties to India and promising relations with several countries, 
especially China, Japan and Russia.
2. Bangladesh politics after the 2014 elections
The 2014 elections represented a watershed in Bangladesh’s politics. 
One year is not enough to evaluate the long-term effects of the elec-
1  ‘Bangladesh has little to celebrate after the most violent election day in its his-
tory’, The Guardian, 15 January 2014; Marzia Casolari, ‘Bangladesh in fiamme: 
dallo scontro politico alla guerriglia urbana’, Asia Maior 2013, pp. 167-80.
2  Ibid.
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toral results (Awami League’s 40% majority and 232 out of 300 seats in 
parliament).3 It is, however, a sufficient lapse of time to draw some conclu-
sions on the short-term effects. 
The entire electoral process, including the results, was very much 
criticized, not only by the opposition but also by some prominent interna-
tional actors.4 The nature of the Bangladeshi democracy was questioned. 
Only 40% of the electorate voted. The restrictions imposed on the two 
main opponents, Khaleda Zia and Mohammad Hossain Ershad, were jus-
tified as measures to prevent violence, but on the polling day alone over 
20 people were shot by the police. In spite of this gloomy start, which 
brought about fears of more violence in 2014, the year turned out to be 
much more peaceful and stable than the previous one.5 Before the first 
session of the 10th National Parliament, held on 29th January 2014, about 
30 members of the outgoing government were dismissed for corruption 
or poor performance, as a sign of the government’s intention to create a 
new political climate.6 
The large majority obtained by the Awami League provided Prime Min-
ister Sheikh Hasina with an unprecedented strength and allowed her and 
her government to put forward several changes and reforms. However, the 
first half of 2014 continued to be influenced by the old patterns of Bang-
ladeshi politics: polarization between the government’s supporters, espe-
cially those belonging to the Shahbag movement, and the wide and well-
organized opposition, political tensions and open clashes. Residual street 
protests and violence went on at the beginning of 2014, with a declining in-
tensity throughout the first part of the year. In 2013, rallies and hartals (the 
general strikes aiming at paralyzing the entire public life of the country) 
nearly caused the country’s economic collapse. The increasing normaliza-
tion of the political situation in 2014 had a positive impact on several sec-
tors and the country’s general mood. The Dhaka Tribune newspaper carried 
out two opinion polls respectively, in June and December 2014.7 While in 
June, only 52% of the interviewees were unhappy with the BNP, in Decem-
ber, the discontent had increased to 62%. Even though the appreciation 
of the Awami League government slightly decreased between the first and 
second half of the year (from 75.3% to 72%), the overall evaluation was 
definitely positive. According to the respondents, «education has been the 
government’s biggest success», while the second was the investment in in-
frastructures. Concern has been expressed for the law and order situation, 
which remains critical. In spite of these results, according to another Dhaka 
3  Marzia Casolari, ‘Bangladesh in fiamme’
4  Ibid.
5  ‘Another beating’, The Economist, 11 January 2014. 
6  ‘Bangladesh: Domestic Politics and External Actors’, IPCS Web Site, 17 February 
2014.
7  ‘72% consider government successful’, Dhaka Tribune, 12 January 2015.
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Tribune poll carried out in the same period, if there was an election at the 
time of the poll, 41% of the interviewees declared they would have voted for 
the Awami League and 34% for the BNP.8 
Nevertheless, 48% of youths between the ages of 18 and 24, expressed 
their preference for the BNP and 34% for the Awami League. The more 
radical character of the BNP, especially of its affiliates, might appeal more 
to youths. Indeed, they seem to be increasingly attracted by international 
Islamic fundamentalism. 
In February 2014, the upazila (sub-district) elections took place. The 
BNP, which boycotted the 2013 vote by abstaining from the general elec-
tions, obtained 123 posts out of 224 candidates, and the Awami League 
obtained 117 out of 295. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) was one of BNP’s main 
allies, even though it had been banned from any polls. The BNP’s re-
sults were interpreted as being due to the JI’s presence within the coali-
tion. This result confirmed Jamaat’s increased popularity in 2014.9 Yet, 
the BNP was facing a deep crisis. The results of the 2014 election, inde-
pendent from the BNP boycott, the ban imposed on the Jamaat by the 
government, and the low percentage of voters, may be interpreted as the 
electorate’s choice of continuity, while the opposition did not represent an 
alternative. Khaleda Zia was carrying out a party reform aimed at rejuve-
nating the party. This would imply an increasingly important role for her 
son, Tarique Rahman, who is supposed to inject a spirit of youth into the 
party. Unfortunately, Khaleda Zia’s son – who is so compromised with cor-
ruption cases to be forced to live abroad – is very unpopular, both within 
and outside Bangladesh.10 
Sheikh Hasina’s electoral success was questioned not only by the Bang-
ladeshi opposition, but also by some foreign powers, the UK and the US 
in particular. While the British criticism was milder,11 the US went to the 
extent of asking «for a free and fair re-election in Bangladesh».12 
Bangladesh’s politics were a matter of debate for the US Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations on 11th February 2014.13 Additional criticism 
came from Jean Lambert, leader of the EU team who visited Bangladesh in 
the spring of 2014; the West remained unsatisfied with the poor progress 
regarding safety measures in favour of the garment industry workers.14 
8  ‘Voters prefer Awami League over BNP’, ibid., 12 January 2015.
9  ‘Islamic party defies Bangladesh ban’, Asia Times, 27 March 2014; ‘Jamaat-e-
Islami in Bangladesh: Where to From Here?’, IPCS Web Site, 22 April 2014.
10  ‘One and only one’, The Economist, 20 September 2014.
11  ‘Bangladesh has little to celebrate after the most violent election day in its his-
tory’, The Guardian, 15 January 2014.
12  ‘Bangladesh Post Elections 2014: India’s Challenges and Options’, IPCS Web 
Site, 20 January 2014.
13  ‘Bangladesh: Domestic Politics’
14  ‘Bangladesh’s Foreign Secretary in New Delhi: Why Now?’, ibid., 1 April 2014.
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As far as the internal situation is concerned, while the political clash 
weakened in 2014, the opposition’s sharp criticism went on. The main 
charges against the government were corruption and human rights 
abuses.
3. Corruption and anti-corruption measures
Corruption has always been endemic in Bangladesh, which contin-
ues to be among the most corrupt countries in the world. Corruption 
involves all fields of Bangladeshi political life. The judiciary is the most 
affected. According to Doing Business 2014, the Global Competitiveness 
Report 2013-2014 and The Transformation Index, Bangladesh’s courts, at 
all levels, «are both inefficient and subject to political influence from 
members of government, citizens and companies». The World Bank & 
IFC and Doing Business 2014 reveal that subscribing to a commercial 
contract in Bangladesh requires, on average, the fulfilment of 41 ad-
ministrative procedures, taking about 1,442 days. According to the Glo-
bal Competitiveness Report 2013-2014, the police are not able to enforce 
law and order. The police themselves are affected by political interfer-
ence, and the punishment of officials and prominent persons is biased 
by political factors. Appointments are determined by «bribes, nepotism 
and party loyalties, rather than by professional qualifications». The 
main reason for bribery within the police is officers’ low salaries. As far 
as the public services are concerned, the Global Competitiveness Report 
2013-2014 states that the bureaucracy is inefficient. According to the 
Investment Climate Statement 2013, ministries often require «unnecessary 
licenses and permits». Factory owners often offer bribes to speed up 
procedures, bypass inspections or relax the rules. Just to give an idea of 
the disastrous consequences of such a situation, cases of bribed inspec-
tors were behind the Rana Plaza tragedy of 2013 and similar accidents 
frequently occurring in Bangladesh’s garment factories. The National 
Board of Revenue, the government authority for tax administration, is 
one of the most corrupt agencies in the country. Tax laws are enforced in 
a discriminatory way and tax evasion is extensive. One of the most cor-
rupt sectors in the country is customs, where the problem extends from 
petty corruption (bribes and kickbacks to customs officers) to unofficial 
or irregular payments of import and export taxes. Officers exert their 
power to change tariffs and to expedite or delay customs processing at 
the frontiers or ports. These problems, and an overall lack of transpar-
ency in trade regulations and policies, represent the obstacles that make 
trading with Bangladesh uncertain. Chittagong port, handling approxi-
mately 80% of the total of Bangladesh’s import-export, is considered 
one of the most corrupt and inefficient ports in Asia. Political patronage 
is enforced to award public contracts for infrastructures in construction, 
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transportation, utilities, and supplies. In April 2014, it was discovered 
that the public gas supplier, Titan Gas, provided illegal gas connections 
to approximately 500 companies. Corrupt officials received bribes for 
each connection. Illegal takeover of government land by politicians is 
frequent. Bangladesh passed several laws against corruption, such as the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, and the Money Laundering Preven-
tion Act of 2002, while the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal 
Code contain specific reference to corruption crimes. The Money Laun-
dering Law has been amended to include norms to prevent stock market 
manipulation. The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was established 
in 2004, but in 2014 its power was significantly curtailed. Indeed, in 
2013 the Anti-Corruption Commission Act was amended, passed by the 
parliament and signed by the president. The amended Act established 
that the ACC was obliged to obtain the government’s permission before 
investigating state officials, including judges. The ACC itself is not cor-
ruption-free. Other bodies involved in anti-corruption initiatives are the 
National Coordination Committee (NCC), the Office of the Ombuds-
man, the Auditor General and the Bangladesh Public Service Commis-
sion (BPSC). All these bodies lack independence and are occasionally 
affected by inefficiency and bribery.15 
This climate does not attract foreign investors. One of the main chal-
lenges the Prime Minister will have to face is enforcing an efficient anti-
corruption policy.
In April 2004, the Chittagong police intercepted a shipment of 
arms and hand grenades worth $5 million. The arms, made in China, 
were directed to insurgents in Assam, to trouble India. Pakistani spies 
seemed to be involved in the case. For years the case was ignored and 
Khaleda Zia, prime minister at that time, did not take any action. Her 
son Tarique Rahman was involved. A number of other corruption cases 
pile up against him in Bangladesh, while he lives in London. Since the 
Awami League came into power in 2009, they have taken the corrup-
tion issue seriously. On 30thJanuary 2014, the court sentenced 14 men 
to be hanged, most of them belonging or affiliated to opposition par-
ties. The charges were smuggling related to the arms haul. Among the 
sentenced was Jamaat-e-Islami’s chief, Motiur Rahman Nizami. Already 
indicted for 1971 war crimes, he faces the risk of being sentenced to 
death twice.16
15  ‘Business Corruption in Bangladesh’, Business Anti-Corruption Portal, June 2014 
(http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/south-asia/bangladesh/
snapshot.aspx). 
16  ‘Bang Bang club’, The Economist, 8 February 2014.
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4. The trial for the 1971 war crimes: a landmark in Bangladeshi history
The charges against the government of human rights abuses, espe-
cially concerned the death sentences and the executions of 2013, related 
to the trials for the crimes of the 1971 civil war. 
The opposition and those among the international observers who 
criticize the trial, do not take into account that the truth about the events 
of 1971 was strongly pursued by the people. The Shahbag movement, one 
of the main supporters of the trial, has relatives of the 1971 war victims 
among its members. The Shahbag activists, which have been described as 
undemocratic, protest peacefully with non-violent methods. The move-
ment is formed mainly by youths and demands the country’s democra-
tization.17 
The prosecution of war criminals had been one of the main elements 
of political polarization and the clash between the government (and its 
supporters) and the opposition. 
The trial went on throughout 2014, although with much less vigour 
than in 2013. 
Undoubtedly, the trial, desired and instigated by Sheikh Hasina’s pre-
vious government in 2013, was partially exploited for electoral purposes. 
After the January 2014 elections, the usefulness of the trial diminished 
and it may have become politically counterproductive. The death of more 
than 100 people in violence related to the trial in 2013 may have affect-
ed the image of the Prime Minister, who adopted a softer approach and 
preferred «to advance her credentials as a wise, legitimate and moderate 
leader by leaving a flawed tribunal to grind forward only very slowly».18 
However, seeing the trial exclusively under this light would lead to 
misunderstanding and underestimating the real impact of the events of 
1971 and the deep scars they left on the Bangladeshi people. A mean-
ingful and politically-conscious part of the population cannot bear the 
injustice of seeing the perpetrators of unspeakable atrocities living un-
disturbed and acting politically, within the organizations of radical Islam. 
Describing the trial simply as an electoral move would be like denying the 
necessity of war crimes trials, from Nuremberg to Cambodia. 
5. Debating on the 1971 civil war: does it make sense?
In 2003, the famous ‘Blood Telegram’ was declassified. It was the tele-
gram sent on 6th April 1971 to the State Department. Signed by the consul 
general, Archer Blood, and by the entire staff of the Consulate General of 
the United States in Dhaka, the telegram deplored the US backing of the 
West Pakistan Army in suppressing the uprisings following the non-rec-
17  Marzia Casolari, ‘Bangladesh in fiamme’.
18  ‘Dialing down’, The Economist, 1 November 2014.
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ognition of the December 1970 election results. Ten years later, between 
August and October 2013, a series of articles about the Blood Telegram 
came into the international press, probably inspired by the ongoing trial. 
Again in 2013, a book, The Blood Telegram, was published by Gary J. Bass, 
a journalist and professor of international politics at Princeton and a 2014 
Pulitzer Prize finalist.19 Based almost exclusively on primary sources, the 
book is a remarkably accurate description of the events of 1971. It is built 
up around the figure and the role of Archer Blood. The consul general and 
the consulate staff were increasingly disgusted by the US government’s in-
action, turning to overt support to Pakistan’s Army crushing Bengali dis-
sent. Besides providing indisputable evidence of American political and 
military support to Pakistan, the most important US ally in Asia, the book 
reconstructs in detail the ‘forgotten’ genocide. It discloses the complexity 
of the events, which involved more than just two enemies opposing each 
other, but several interwoven rivalries: Muslims against Hindus; Bengalis 
against Biharis; and the Pakistani Army against the Awami League and 
the Mukti Bahini. Atrocities were committed by both sides, the army and 
its collaborators, and the Mukti Bahini. Bass’ book does not enter into the 
details of the responsibilities of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Razakar Bahini 
and other radical Muslim organizations in the massacre, but it focuses on 
the international intrigues behind the war: US-Pakistan relations; rela-
tions between Pakistan, China and India; and Pakistan’s role in facilitating 
the China-US rapprochement, in view of the Sino-American negotiations 
at the end of the Vietnam war. The main subject of the book is Kissinger 
and Nixon’s staunch support to West Pakistan and to the Pakistani Army. 
Strangely, the book did not have such remarkable resonance in Bangla-
desh as it had in the West, especially in Great Britain and in the United States, 
where it was reviewed by several famous newspapers and magazines.20 
In Bangladesh, the only noticeable article appeared in the Dhaka Tribune 
on 14th August 2013: The Blood Telegram, Case for an American Apology. The 
article does not mention Bass’ book, but it extensively discusses the subject 
of the American President and Secretary of State’s active involvement in 
the events of 1971. The article draws the conclusion that «the American 
government does owe Bangladesh a long due apology», like Pervez Mush-
arraf did during his presidency. As noted by the article, Musharraf was «the 
only Pakistani head-of-state to personally apologise to Bangladesh for the 
atrocities committed during the 1971 liberation war». 
A more recent paper by an Italian scholar focuses on India’s response to 
the 1971 crisis «as one of the first cases of humanitarian intervention in world 
19  Gary J. Bass, The Blood Telegram. Nixon, Kissinger and a Forgotten Genocide, Lon-
don: Hurst, 2014.
20  The Economist, 21 September 2013; The New York Times, 27 September 2013; The 
Washington Post, 10 October 2013; The New Republic, 9 November 2013. 
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history» and calls into question this interpretation.21 Even if the most recent 
literature on the subject does not deal with the question behind the trial of 
the JI’s war criminals, these scholarly and well-documented studies prove 
that the 1971 war crimes do not represent a subject that can simply be dis-
missed as electoral propaganda. More light has to be shed on the topic from 
a historical point of view and justice has to be done on behalf of the victims. 
Stating this does not mean to defend the death penalty. However, justice has 
to be done, and this brings about the need to impose appropriate penalties 
on those guilty of war crimes. Hopefully, especially after its post-electoral sta-
bilization, the Bangladeshi government, in judging and punishing war crimi-
nals, will adopt an attitude in line with its declared aspiration to democracy. 
6. A 360-degree foreign policy 
6.1. India first
Due to its sustained economic growth over the past few years, Bangla-
desh can no longer be considered an underdeveloped country, the ‘basket 
case’ of the 1970s. Bangladesh indeed is becoming an increasingly impor-
tant nation in the region, not only from the economic, but also from the 
strategic point of view. It lies across South and Southeast Asia, right at the 
centre of the highway under construction, which will connect these two im-
portant regions. Bangladesh is also facing the Bay of Bengal, which is at-
tractive not only for its commercially interesting coastal area, but especially 
for its largely unexplored oil reserves. Bangladesh is therefore becoming 
the pole of multiple interests. India is the most directly and deeply involved 
power within Bangladesh, especially for its position. Whilst China does not 
border directly with Bangladesh, India shares a border with this country, 
a huge and troublesome frontier. India has several strategic, political and 
economic interests in Bangladesh. Firstly, Bangladesh has a key geographic 
position to contain Chinese expansion in South Asia. Secondly, India has a 
special link with Bangladesh, due to its involvement in the 1971 liberation 
war, which turned into the third Indo-Pakistani war. On the other hand, the 
new era of Bangladesh foreign policy, inaugurated by Sheikh Hasina’s sec-
ond term of government, aims primarily at developing good relations with 
India. The government of Delhi supported the Awami League’s re-elec-
tion, encouraging a democratic transition in Bangladesh. For the world’s 
largest democracy, promoting democracy elsewhere is a priority, in a region 
where authoritarian governments are most common. A secular and demo-
cratic Bangladesh can also help to contain the expansion of radical Islam 
in South Asia, and especially in India. Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh 
(JMB), whose main objective is to establish an Islamic state in Bangladesh, 
21  Sonia Cordera, ‘India’s response on the 1971 East Pakistan crisis: hidden and open 
reasons for intervention’, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 2015. 
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and other groups such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the Jagrata 
Muslim Janata, are spreading in the region. India is used by the JMB for 
hideouts and for recruitment through the madrasas, the mosques and the 
social networks. JMB is connected with radical Muslim groups in India, as 
well as in Pakistan and Afghanistan. A recent JMB slogan is «Jihad from 
Bangladesh to Baghdad». JMB is also active in Myanmar, where it relies 
on the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO). Most of these groups act 
against India through their connections within the country, in particular 
among insurgents in border areas, especially in the Muslim-majority dis-
tricts of Assam. India does not want to have another Pakistan on its eastern 
border and it is interested in cooperating to fight the expansion of ter-
rorism in the region. Bangladesh has a key position in India’s ‘Look East 
Policy’. The main sector of Indian investment in South East Asia is infra-
structure. In the region, India attempts the development of communica-
tions such as ports on the Bay of Bengal, trans-border railways connecting 
India more directly with its remote north-east regions or the superhighway 
connecting India with Southeast Asia.22 Regional connectivity is a key factor 
to develop trade and investments. Last but not least, India, as well as the US 
and China, have obvious interests in Bangladesh’s energy resources. Both 
countries are interested in fostering bilateral ties.
The Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh, Shahidul Haque, visited India 
from 19th to 21st March 2014, on invitation from his Indian counterpart, 
Sujatha Singh. At the meetings, the Minister of External Affairs, the In-
dian National Security Adviser, and the secretaries of several ministries 
took part. The visit had a rather formal character, considering the ap-
proaching end of Manmohan Singh’s mandate. No decision was taken 
about sensitive issues such as the sharing of the Teesta waters that, in 
absence of an agreement, gave rise to many years of disputes, or regard-
ing the land and sea boundary controversies.23 The Teesta dispute ended 
on 7th July 2014, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague 
awarded Bangladesh 19,467 km2 of coast out of the 25,602 km2 in the Bay 
of Bengal, leaving 6,135 km2 to India. It was a historic settlement, putting 
an end to a 40-year controversy between Bangladesh and India.24 
Before the 2014 Indian general elections, the favourite candidate, 
right-wing leader Narendra Modi, was seen in Bangladesh as a controver-
sial figure, particularly because of his pre-election statements against illegal 
22  ‘Bangladesh Post Elections 2014: India’s Challenges and Options’, IPCS Web 
Site, 20 January 2014; ‘Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh: Designs and Network 
in India’, ibid., 7 November 2014.
23 ‘Bangladesh’s Foreign Secretary in New Delhi: Why Now’, ibid., 1 April 2014; ‘India-
Bangladesh Relations: Significance of the Teesta Water-Sharing Agreement’, ibid., 23 
April 2014; ‘A Ray of Hope for India-Bangladesh Relations?’, ibid., 1 July 2014.
24  ‘India-Bangladesh: Can the Maritime Boundary Resolution Rebuilt Faith?’, 
ibid., 24 July 2014.
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Bangladeshi immigration, which had raised much concern in the country. 
After the elections, Modi’s proposed measures to combat illegal immigra-
tion from Bangladesh provoked an anti-Indian uproar in Dhaka. However, 
those initial fears have, to a large extent, been dissipated by some positive 
diplomatic developments. The visit of the Bangladeshi Foreign Secretary 
to India was followed by a trip by the External Affairs Minister of the newly 
elected Indian government, Sushma Swaraj, to Bangladesh from 25th to 
27th June 2014.25 The Indian minister defined the visit as «extremely fruit-
ful and satisfying» and once back to New Delhi, she claimed that her visit 
had resulted in «an excellent beginning in addressing each others’ con-
cerns and work together with the spirit of good neighbourliness».26 The 
Indian Foreign Affairs Minister met several top-level Bangladeshi politi-
cians: the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the President Abdul Hamid, the 
Bangladeshi Minister of External Affairs A.H. Mahmud Ali, the leader of 
the opposition, Raushan Ershad, and the former prime minister, Khaleda 
Zia. The crucial moment of Sushma Swaraj’s visit was her speech to the 
civil society, held at the Bangladesh Institute of Strategic Studies (BIISS). 
The Indian Foreign Minister opened her talk «with a message of friendship 
and goodwill from the newly elected Government in India» and went on 
speaking about «comprehensive and equitable partnership» between the 
two countries, and «mutual beneficial relations, youth development and 
youth-led development». She mentioned the enormous human sacrifice 
that united India and Bangladesh in the 1971 war and defined «Banga-
bandhu Mujibur Rahman as the architect of Bangladesh».27 
The evidence that Sushma Swaraj’s visit was not just diplomatic smoke 
but had some political substance was given by a few concrete steps taken 
in the following weeks. Visa relaxation for children under 13 and citizens 
above 65 was implemented. The Indian deputy Minister of External Af-
fairs and the Minister of Development of North Eastern Region (DoNER), 
General V.K. Singh, visited Bangladesh on 23rd and 24th August 2014. The 
trip was carefully prepared through a meeting with the Chief Ministers of 
the Northeastern States, held in Guwahati, just before his visit to Dhaka. 
Manik Sarkar, the Tripura’s Chief Minister, asked for transit facilities by 
road, rail and sea through Bangladesh to the landlocked Northeast. Ac-
cess to the waterways is a demand of the entire region since the partition. 
Besides connectivity, trade and commerce have been the keywords of Gen. 
Singh’s visit to Dhaka. He spoke about India’s intention to increase bilat-
eral trade between Bangladesh and India.28 
25  ‘Dhaka as the Gateway to India’s Look East Policy’, ibid., 27 June 2014.
26  ‘Sushma Swaraj leaves for home after Bangladesh visit’, The Economic Times, 27 
June 2014.
27  ‘India-Bangladesh: After Sushma Swaraj’s Visit’, IPCS, 21 July 2014. Sheik 
Mujibur Rahman was popularly referred with the honorary title of Bangabandhu, 
namely ‘Friend of Bengal’.
28  ‘India and Bangladesh: The Northeast Thrust’, ibid., 27 August 2014. 
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At the end of 2014, the 31-member Parliamentary Standing Com-
mittee on External Affairs chaired by Shashi Tharoor recommended in 
«overall national interest», to settle the India-Bangladesh boundary dis-
pute through an exchange between Delhi and Dhaka of enclaves and ter-
ritories in «adverse possession» of either country. If an agreement was be 
finalized, India would receive 2,777 acres of land and Bangladesh 2,267. 
The possible settlement has been defined as an example of good diplo-
macy and it would also set a precedent for the solution of the Sino-Indian 
border dispute.29 
6.2. A multilateral regional policy
Bangladesh’s foreign policy is facing a new era. It may be more ap-
propriate to say that Bangladesh is developing its own foreign policy for 
the first time. The country is no longer the passive target of other nations’ 
policies or a mere recipient of external aid, as it has been since its foun-
dation. The incumbent Sheikh Hasina’s government has already started 
to develop a regional multilateral policy, which received a much greater 
impetus after the Awami League re-election in 2014. As one of the found-
ing members of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Techni-
cal and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Bangladesh has an increas-
ingly prominent role within the organization. After including Nepal and 
Bhutan in 2004, BIMSTEC has seven members. The founders are India, 
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand. It covers an area stretch-
ing from South to Southeast Asia, «with over 22% of the world population 
and a collective GDP of nearly $2 trillion». The group has an impres-
sive geopolitical and economic importance. The third BIMSTEC summit, 
held in Naypyidaw, Myanmar’s capital, from 3rd to 4th March 2014, was 
the occasion for Sheikh Hasina to launch intensive diplomatic activity. 
The Bangladeshi prime minister, who led a delegation of 54 members, 
met with his counterparts in India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and My-
anmar, and with Myanmar’s opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. The 
government of Bangladesh is particularly interested in improving trade 
and cooperation with Myanmar. Both countries wish to be part of the road 
connectivity project for the construction of the highway connecting India 
to Thailand through Bangladesh and Myanmar. The two countries are 
also planning to build seaports in Sittwe and Kyaukpyu to run a shipping 
line. In 2011, it was decided to establish the permanent secretariat of 
BIMSTEC in Dhaka, which started functioning in May 2014.30 
Bangladesh is also a member of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
(BCIM) forum for economic cooperation, which held its second meeting 
29  ‘India-Bangladesh LBA: Setting the Right Tone’, ibid., 9 December 2014.
30  ‘East Meets West: Bangladesh and the BIMSTEC Summit’, IPCS Web Page, 17 
March 2014.
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in Dhaka in June 2014. BCIM aims at establishing an economic corridor 
along the old Southern Silk Road, connecting the Bay of Bengal, India’s 
Northeastern Region, Bangladesh and Myanmar to Southwest China. One 
of the BCIM objectives is to integrate the economies of India, China and the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA), representing 7.3% of the global GDP. India 
aims at reaching the Chinese market, as well as balancing China’s influence 
in the region through a multilateral BCIM-FTA integration. A further con-
vergence between BCIM and BIMSTEC is also possible in the future.31 
Bangladesh is not only the ‘gateway’ of India’s ‘Look East Policy’, but 
it has its own ‘Look East Policy’. Bangladesh has obviously much to gain 
and nothing to lose, from an economic point of view, in pursuing a re-
gional foreign policy. Southeast Asia indeed is not only one of the world’s 
most hectic and attractive economic areas, but it is also the destination of 
Bangladeshi labour, above all, Singapore and Malaysia.32 
Regional connectivity includes energy cooperation. In early 2014, 
Bangladesh agreed to provide India a power corridor passing through its 
territory and allowing the transmission of 6,000 MW of hydroelectricity 
from Arunachal Pradesh to Bihar. In exchange, Bangladesh will receive 
500 MW. This was the third bilateral energy agreement. The previous two 
were signed in 2013. The first was a power grid to allow the transmission 
of 500 MW of energy from India to Bangladesh. The second was the es-
tablishment of a joint venture between India and Bangladesh to construct 
a 1,320 MW coal-fired power plant at Rampat Upazila.33
6.3. Bangladesh, China and Japan
The new foreign policy of Bangladesh aims at extending much be-
yond the region and includes the other Asian giants, besides India. A 
busy round of meetings took place from May to September 2014, between 
Bangladesh, China and Japan. From 25th to 28th May, the Prime Minister, 
Sheikh Hasina, was in Japan. A visit to China followed, in quick succession, 
from 6th to 11th June 2014. Finally, the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo 
Abe, was in Dhaka for less than 24 hours on 6th September 2014.34 
The first remarkable result of the Bangladesh-China summit was four 
military agreements signed on 12th May, in the presence of a Chinese del-
egation led by Chief Marshal of the People’s Army, Air Force General Xu 
Qiliang. The treaty included Chinese free of charge training and logistic 
31  ‘BCIM and BIMSTEC: Two Competing Initiatives for Northeast India?’, ibid., 
20 May 2014.
32  ‘Dhaka as the Gateway’.
33  ‘India-Bangladesh: Enhancing Ties through a «Power Corridor»’, ibid., 21 April 
2014.
34  ‘Japanese PM arrives September 6’, 13 August 2014 (http://bdnews24.com/
bangladesh/2014/08/13/japanese-pm-arrives-sept-6). 
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support to the Bangladeshi army. Through the years, Bangladesh and 
China signed several bilateral agreements regarding trade, military sales, 
energy, transit and cultural exchanges. In March 2014, Bangladesh com-
missioned two navy frigates from China. In April, the two countries signed 
an agreement on the sale of two submarines to Bangladesh, which included 
the establishment at Kutubdia Island, in the Cox Bazar District, of a base 
for 035G diesel-electric Ming submarines, to be completed by 2019. Be-
tween 2009 and 2013, China supplied 82% of Bangladesh’s arms imports, 
including anti-ship missiles, tanks and fighter airplanes. Low costs and loan 
facilities are the reasons for Bangladesh’s arms purchases from China, even 
though the armed forces are not happy with the quality of Chinese military 
goods. Chinese arms are the cheapest in the world.35 China’s financial sup-
port to Bangladesh has increased significantly in the last three years. The 
largest-ever infrastructure project in Bangladesh, the Padma multipurpose 
bridge, is to be built by China Major Bridge Engineering Company. China 
is also engaged in constructing a rail bridge over the Jamuna River and a 
high-speed railway between Dhaka and Comill.36
In 2014, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding for 
the construction of a 1,320 MW power plant in Moheshkhali sub-district. 
The launch of the first Bangladeshi satellite, Bangabandhu, was the outcome 
of the technical and infrastructural cooperation with China. On the other 
side, China is interested in entering the Bay of Bengal for its strategic im-
portance and its energy resources. China is engaged in the modernization of 
Chittagong port. This project meets Bangladesh’s need to develop its naval 
infrastructure. China is competing with India and the US for access to the 
strategically important Indian Ocean region. From this perspective, Bang-
ladesh is becoming a strong player in regional balances. It is acquiring, for 
instance, an increasing weight within the BCIM, as proved by the BCIM-EC 
meeting held in Dhaka in June 2014.37 As a result of the May 2014 Sheikh 
Hasina visit to China, an agreement was signed for Chinese assistance in 
the construction of a power plant in Patuakhali and a multi-lane road tun-
nel under the river Karnaphuli. Chinese president Xi Jinping emphasized 
Bangladesh’s role along the 21st century Maritime Silk Road.38 
While Sheikh Hasina’s visit to China in May 2014 was part of a series 
of meetings and exchanges which took place over the last few years, the 
visit to Japan ushered a new phase in bilateral relations between the two 
countries. Moreover, the visit of the Japanese premier to Dhaka in Sep-
tember 2014 was the first official trip to Bangladesh of a high member 
of the Japanese government for 15 years. The respective prime minis-
35  ‘Bangladesh: A New Thrust towards East Asia’, IPCS Web Site, 6 June 2014. 
36  ‘Bangladesh, China and Japan: Dhaka’s Delicate Balancing’, ibid., 17 Septem-
ber 2014. 
37  ‘Bangladesh-China: Respective Objectives and Strategies’, IPCS Web Site, 30 May 2014. 
38  ‘Bangladesh: A New Thrust’.
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ters signed a 21-point Comprehensive Partnership Agreement which en-
gaged Japan to support Bangladesh’s development programmes. Since 
2007, the number of Japanese companies operating in Bangladesh has 
increased from 61 to 176, and aid from Japan amounted to $11 million in 
2013. Japan is also engaged in large-scale investments in Bangladesh.
An agreement has been signed on infrastructure developmental 
projects in Bangladesh: the construction of the Ganges barrage scheme; 
a multimodal tunnel under the Jamuna River; a multimodal Dhaka 
Eastern bypass; the Padma rail link connecting Dhaka-Jajira-Bhanga-
Narail-Jessore; the construction of an inland depot at Dhirasram; and 
the purification of four rivers around Dhaka. Japan offered its support 
for capacity-building in nuclear security and safety. Japan’s engagement 
in Bangladesh’s infrastructural development amounts to $6 billion over 
the next five years for the implementation of the Bay of Bengal Industrial 
Growth Belt (BIG-B), which includes the construction of a deep sea port 
at Chittagong. The area is supposed to become a base for the supply of 
energy and the construction of superhighways across the country. A Mem-
orandum of Understanding was signed for the reservation of facilities for 
Japanese investors in five Export Processing Zones in Bangladesh. 
Japan has also promised a loan of $1.18 billion in the next fiscal year 
for five energy and city developing projects in Bangladesh. Japan dictated 
some conditions for its financial support, such as competitive incentives, 
and improvement in infrastructure and in labour supply.
Like India and China, Japan also has its strategic interests in South 
Asia, above all, connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean re-
gions, in order to provide a larger space for Japan’s economic goals. The 
relations between Bangladesh, India, China and Japan are based on mu-
tual interests. Sheikh Hasina aims at making Bangladesh a middle-income 
country by 2021. This objective cannot be pursued without strong foreign 
investment. Bangladesh must, therefore, maintain friendly relations with 
all its powerful neighbours. Significantly, during Abe’s visit, Bangladesh 
announced the withdrawal of its candidacy as a non-permanent member 
of the United Nations Security Council from the Asia Pacific group in 
2016–2017.39 Was it a courtesy gesture to leave the place to Japan, in or-
der to ingratiate it and further improve and consolidate bilateral ties? 
6.4. Bangladesh and Russia 
Outside East and South Asia, Bangladesh’s main partner is Russia. Sig-
nificantly, on 27th March 2014, Bangladesh, along with 57 other members, 
abstained from voting at the UN General Assembly resolution for Russia’s 
39  Ibid.; ‘Bangladesh, China and Japan’; ‘Abe’s Successful Visit to Dhaka: Two Po-
litical Challenges’, IPCS., 15 September 2014.
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annexation of the Crimea. Messages followed from the Russian Ambassador 
to Dhaka, acknowledging Bangladesh’s stand. The most remarkable detail 
in this story is Dhaka’s explanation of its abstention: Bangladesh does not 
want to get involved «in the new cold war between Russian and the US», 
according to the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement. This statement 
takes us back to the cold war times. It reveals that the cold war climate, 
fuelled by the US, cannot go unnoticed. Thirdly, Bangladesh and other 
countries continue to choose and propose a line of foreign policy based 
on multi-polarism, although not necessarily non-alignment. Bangladesh’s 
abstention has been sharply criticized and Dhaka was charged as having 
turned its back on the Western countries and the US, which are very much 
committed to Bangladesh’s development. Dhaka has cordial relations with 
Russia since Sheikh Hasina’s taking office in 2009. She visited Moscow in 
2013, signing the largest arms deal in Bangladesh’s history and obtaining a 
loan for the construction of Bangladesh’s first nuclear power plant, for an 
estimated cost of $2 billion.40 In November 2013, Bangladesh supported 
Ekaterinburg instead of the United Arab Emirates as a candidate for World 
Expo 2020. Russia (and India) supported Sheikh Hasina’s government 
during its critical post-election days, in early 2014.41 
6.5. Bangladesh within the UN
Bangladesh’s 360 degrees foreign policy is summarized by its participa-
tion in the 69th UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2014. It was also 
the 40th anniversary of Bangladesh’s membership at the UN. Sheikh Hasina 
led a 184-member delegation. For the first time, Bangladesh acquired a re-
markable visibility at the UN. The UNGA was the occasion for a number of 
meetings and for promoting Bangladesh’s economic interests. The most im-
portant meetings were those with the UN Secretary, General Ban Ki-moon, 
the Commonwealth Secretary General, Kamalesh Sharma, Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi, and US president Barack Obama. Sheikh Hasi-
na also met the Norwegian, Nepalese and Belarusian prime ministers, the 
Commonwealth heads of government, US businessmen and a delegation of 
Bangladeshi expatriates. Even though these meetings may have had limited 
practical results, they at least represented a chance to promote Bangladesh 
and establish or strengthen ties for future developments. The Hasina-Modi 
meeting was the most meaningful, for several reasons. Firstly, it was the first 
ever meeting between the two prime ministers and, therefore, it was also 
much awaited. Secondly, it was important for the two leaders to get to know 
each other and continue to cultivate positive bilateral ties for the future. In 
40  During Hasina’s first mandate, Bangladesh purchased from Russia 10 MiG-21s. 
41  ‘Is Bangladesh’s foreign policy becoming India and Russia-centric?’, ibid., 15 
April 2014. 
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spite of the change in the political leadership of India, the BJP government 
seems to be willing to adopt the line of its predecessor and maintain coopera-
tive relations with Dhaka. During India-Bangladesh talks, Mr Modi praised 
Bangladesh and defined it as «a model for fighting terrorism».42 
6.6. Bangladesh-US controversial relations 
Last but not least, US-Bangladesh relations deserve specific attention. 
The US expressed sharp criticism regarding the democratic correctness of 
the 2014 election results, decrying as inappropriate the Awami League’s 
decision to fight them in spite of the BNP’s abstention. The real rea-
sons for the barely concealed US hostility towards Sheik Hasina’s govern-
ment, however, seem to be different. The special ties between India and 
Bangladesh have irritated Washington: India has been granted access to 
Bangladeshi ports and road networks; Indian companies have obtained 
exclusive rights on Bangladesh’s gas reserves; Bangladesh’s market has 
been flooded with Indian goods; taxes have been increased on Japanese 
imported cars, while being lowered on Indian cars; and the Indian tel-
ecommunication company, Bharti Airtel, has obtained tax advantages 
over other foreign companies. This policy – largely the outcome of Sheik 
Hasina’s decisions – is defined as «irrational» by the US and the media 
which support the North American country. Also, India is charged with 
interfering with Bangladesh’s internal affairs and exerting a hegemonic 
role in South Asia.43 These factors interfere with American interests in the 
region, where Bangladesh is seen as an increasingly important player. 
Firstly, Bangladesh straddles the new land and sea Silk Road envisioned 
by Washington, which should connect Central to Southeast Asia, 
passing across Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar 
and China. Secondly, Bangladesh, with its large and growing middle 
class, is becoming a very attractive market. Finally, Bangladesh’s skilled 
labour is a resource for industrial investments. The US is the largest 
market for Bangladesh’s ready-made garments, the pivotal industrial 
production of the country. All the above-mentioned are economic 
advantages that the US could reap depending on Bangladesh’s (and 
India’s) attitude. The US expects to corner a conspicuous share of 
the huge economic gains to be made across South and Southeast Asia 
42  ‘Bangladesh: Diplomatic Manoeuvres at the UNGA’, ibid., 20 October 2014.
43  In 2011, Chuck Hagel – whom President Barack Obama was to nominate Sec-
retary of Defence on 7 January 2013 – had declared that India made use of its 
influence in Afghanistan against Pakistan, thus increasing instability in the region. 
‘«India financed problems for Pakistan» from Afghanistan: Chuck Hagel’, The Ex-
press Tribune, 26 February 2013.
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and around the Bay of Bengal. However, the increasingly close Delhi-
Dhaka connection obviously disturbs Washington.44 
7. Economy and social issues
South Asia’s economic growth was 5.4% in September 2014 and 6.1% 
is expected for 2015. The optimistic forecasts for 2015 stem from the 
expected reforms of the Indian government to revive economic growth 
and from Bangladesh’s and Nepal’s sustained expansion.45 Bangladesh’s 
economic growth is supported by remittance inflows and by a strong in-
ternal demand.46
Bangladesh’s economy has grown rapidly since 2009 and it doubled 
the results of Khaleda Zia’s government in 2006. This is considered one 
of Sheikh Hasina’s main successes.47 
Thanks to Sheikh Hasina’s intense diplomatic activity, bilateral trade 
with Myanmar amounted to $100 million in 2014; it should reach $500 
million after the construction of the Sittwe-Kyaukpyu shipping line and 1 
billion by 2020.48 
In spite of these encouraging results, in 2014 foreign investors adopt-
ed a cautious approach, fearing possible new political unrest due to the 
still precarious political situation.49 Nevertheless, since the Bilateral In-
vestment Protection and Promotion Agreement (BIPPA) signed by India 
and Bangladesh in 2009, the latter country became increasingly attractive 
for Indian investors. The main sectors where Indian companies have in-
vested are power transmission lines, telecommunications, textiles, chemi-
cals and pharmaceuticals, glass, plastics and engineering. Indian invest-
ments in Bangladesh in 2012 amounted to $2.5 million and contributed 
to creating 51,653 jobs.50 The South Asia Subregional Economic Coopera-
tion (SASEC) Working Group, held in Kathmandu in November 2014, 
noted the progress of transport connectivity projects, but it recommended 
the completion of the still missing links, in order to transform transport 
corridors into economic corridors, and to promote multimodal transport 
connectivity to increase trade and investment opportunity among existing 
44  ‘India-US chasm opens over Bangladesh’, Asia Times, 21 January 2014; ‘Bangla-
desh-US: Long Term Agendas over Short Term Fall-Outs’, IPCS Web Site, 30 April 
2014. 
45  ‘Regional Cooperation Operations Business Plan South Asia 2015-2017’, Asian 
Development Bank, December 2014.
46  ‘Growth Hesitates in Developing Asia’, Asia Development Outlook Supplement, De-
cember 2014. 
47  ‘One and only one’.
48  ‘East Meets West’.
49  ‘Bangladesh’s Foreign Secretary’.
50  ‘India and Bangladesh’.
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(and possibly future) corridors. Electricity transmission is the priority of 
SASEC Energy Working Group, with India as the hub interconnecting the 
projects of the SASEC countries. The use of regular ADB country-specific 
funding for national projects with regional implications is expected.51 
***
Per la prima volta nella storia del Bangladesh, un primo ministro uscente ha 
vinto per la seconda volta consecutiva le elezioni. Questo è quanto è accaduto a 
Sheikh Hasina e al partito da lei guidato, la Lega Awami, a seguito delle elezioni 
del gennaio 2014. Sia l’opposizione, rappresentata soprattutto dal Bangladesh 
National Party (BNP) e dalla Jamaat-e Islam (JI), sia una parte della comunità 
internazionale hanno commentato negativamente tale risultato elettorale e il 
modo stesso in cui è stato raggiunto. Si è rimproverato infatti a Sheikh Hasina 
di avere voluto tenere le elezioni nonostante la decisione da parte del BNP e del 
JI di non parteciparvi. Una critica, questa, che non tiene conto del fatto che il 
mandato di Sheikh Hasina fosse giunto alla sua scadenza naturale e che sarebbe 
stato pretestuoso e antidemocratico rimandare i tempi delle elezioni in seguito a 
un’arbitraria imposizione da parte dei partiti d’opposizione. Sul fronte estero, le 
principali critiche all’esito elettorale sono arrivate dalla Gran Bretagna e dagli 
Stati Uniti. Quelle statunitensi sembrano essere state motivate non tanto dalle 
asserite questioni formali, quanto dal fatto, ben più sostanziale, che durante il 
governo di Sheikh Hasina il vigoroso rinserrarsi dei rapporti fra Bangladesh 
e India potrebbe tradursi in una diminuzione dell’influenza di Washington su 
Dacca. 
Nel 2014 è poi proseguito il processo agli imputati per i crimini commessi 
durante la guerra civile del 1971, anche se con minore durezza di quanto non 
sia accaduto nel 2013, quando si era arrivati a due condanne a morte e a 
un’esecuzione. 
Il secondo governo di Sheikh Hasina ha proceduto in due direzioni: sul piano 
interno, ha avviato un processo di democratizzazione e, sul piano internazionale, 
ha inaugurato una nuova politica estera, centrata sui rapporti regionali e 
volta a sfruttare al massimo la posizione strategica del Bangladesh per ottenere 
investimenti e vantaggi dai partner economici. Il Bangladesh si affaccia sul 
Golfo del Bengala, un’area doppiamente importante per i suoi giacimenti di gas 
naturale e per i collegamenti marittimi est-ovest. Inoltre, il Bangladesh si trova 
proprio al centro del crocevia tra Asia meridionale, Cina e Sud-est asiatico, lungo 
la direttrice di una rete di connessioni stradali, ferroviarie e marittime che gli Stati 
Uniti definiscono significativamente «Via della seta marittima del 21° secolo».
51  ‘Regional Cooperation Operations Business Plan’.
